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I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE RECENT EMERGENCE of the commercial human spaceflight industry is a transformative moment in the his-
tory of mankind. Although the story of human spaceflight be-
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gan when Yuri Gagarin first orbited the Earth in 1961, recent 
technological developments coupled with the dedication of well-
funded entrepreneurs have taken spaceflight from the province 
of governmental action and delivered it into the private sector. 1 
Multiple space tourism companies are planning to send private 
passengers on suborbital and orbital flights within the coming 
years, private spaceports are being built around the world, and 
at least one company is well on its way to placing private space 
stations into orbit to serve as manufacturing facilities, laborato-
ries, or even space hotels.2 Moreover, changes to the U.S. Space 
Policy recently proposed by the Obama Administration would 
accelerate the development of the human spaceflight industry.3 
These proposals call for the abolition of NASA's Constellation 
program that entailed the development of the next generation 
of government space vehicles-and instead recommend that the 
government set aside six billion dollars to purchase crew and 
cargo delivery services from private companies to meet govern-
ment requirements for ferrying cargo and crew to the Interna-
tional Space Station and placing satellites into orbit.4 This 
increased demand for services will enable private space compa-
nies to develop the next generation of space vehicles that will 
likely include a line of reusable launch vehicles that should im-
prove greatly upon the current space shuttle technology. 5 
Despite this bright outlook for commercial human spacef-
light, the industry faces several significant challenges before it 
achieves sustainability. Although these challenges are largely 
technological and financial, one of the more serious obstacles to 
the industry's success is regulatory in nature, namely, the bur-
densome export control regulations under U.S. law. Export 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 Kenneth Chang, Obama Calls for End to NASA's Moon Program, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/science/02nasa.html. 
4 Id. Even before this new policy emerged, a private company, Elon Musk's 
SpaceX, already received a NASA contract to deliver cargo to the International 
Space Station. Press Release, NASA, NASA Awards Launch Services Contract to 
SpaceX (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/apr/HQ_CO 
8023_KSC_launch_ seivices.html; see also Dana Hedgpeth, Smaller Companies Win 
NASA's Space Race, WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 2008, at DI. 
5 The Obama Administration's proposal has met with resistance both in the 
Senate and, in particular, in the House of Representatives, thus making it unclear 
to what extent the President's policy will be implemented. Kenneth Chang, Sen-
ate Committee's NASA Plan Cuts Moon Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at Al6; 
Kenneth Chang, House Panel's NASA Spending Bill Cuts Back Obama Plan, N.Y. 
TIMEs,July 20, 2010, at Al2. 
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controls on space technology are notoriously strict in the United 
States, where all technology related to spacecraft is subject to 
the same complicated and restrictive export controls that gov-
ern the export of munitions under the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR).6 In fact, the United States is the only 
country in the world that treats commercial space technology 
like munitions, rather than as dual-use technology that has a pri-
marily commercial application. 7 The application of ITAR to 
space technology has harmed the ability of U.S. space compa-
nies to compete on the world market, as is perhaps best illus-
trated by the practice of certain European satellite 
manufacturers to market "ITAR-free" satellites-that is, satellites 
that do not incorporate any components manufactured in the 
United States and are therefore free of the regulatory complexi-
ties and compliance costs that flow from ITAR. 8 As a result, Eu-
ropean satellite sales have increased sharply, cutting deeply into 
6 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R §§ 120.1-130.17 (2009). 
There is no shortage of commentators who criticize the complexity of ITAR. See, 
e.g., R. Aylan Broadbent, U.S. Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: Is 
the High Tech Industry Suffering?, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE LAw LJ. 49 (1999); 
Jason A. Crook, National Insecurity: !TAR and the Technological Impairment of U.S. 
National Space Policy, 74]. AIR L. & CoM. 505 (2009); Trevor Hiestand, Swards into 
Plowshares: Considerations far 21st Century Export Controls in the United States, 9 EMORY 
INT'L L. REv. 679, 690-91 (1995); Cecil Hunt, U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WITH 
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 19 (2000) (describing the U.S. system of export controls 
as a "frightful labyrinth"); Jere W. Morehead & David A. Dismuke, Export Control 
Policies and National Security: Protecting U.S. Interests in the New Millenium, 34 TEx. 
INT'L LJ. 173, 180 (1999); Ronald]. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress-Nuclear 
Triggers to Lib-ya, Missile Guidance to China, Air Defense to Iraq, Arms Supplier to the 
Warld: Has the Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S. Export Control Regime?-The 
Case far Immediate Ref arm of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self Defeating Export Control 
System, 37 TEx. INT'L LJ. 89, 92 (2002). Even the Department of Defense has now 
openly criticized the complexity of the current export control regime. DEP'T OF 
DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REvrnw REPORT 83 (2010), http://www.defense.gov/ 
QDR/images/QDR_as_of_l2Febl0_1000.pdf (explaining that "our overly com-
plicated system results in significant interagency delays that hinder U.S. industrial 
competitiveness and cooperation with allies"). 
' For a description of the European approach to export controls with respect 
to space technology, see generally Laurent Crapart, The Implementation of Export 
Controls in the European Community-Making Balance Between Security and Commercial 
Considerations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOKIY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF 
OUTER SPACE 246 (2004); Antonella Bini, Export Control of Space Items: Preserving 
Europe's Advantage, 23 SPACE Poucv 70 (2007); Frans von der Dunk, A European 
"Equivale:1t" to the United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control of Inter-
national Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies, 7 AsTROPOLITIC.S 101 (2009). 
8 See Center for Strategic and International Studies, Briefing of the Warking 
Group on the Health of the U.S. Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export Controls, 
at 10, Executive Summary, Findings 10 & 11 (Feb. 2008); Bini, supra note 7, at 70 
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the market share of U.S. manufacturers.9 U.S.-based space tour-
ism companies and other private spaceflight companies are sure 
to suffer the same ill effects of ITAR unless relief is provided 
either by legal reform or through the granting of special discre-
tionary relief by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC), which is the administrative agency that oversees the 
application and enforcement of ITAR.10 
On August 13, 2009, the Obama Administration announced 
that the President had established a task force to undertake a 
broad-based review of U.S. export controls, which will include a 
review of those controls applicable to satellites and other space 
technology. 11 In order to expedite the process of reform, Presi-
dent Obama issued Presidential Study Directive 8 on December 
21, 2009, which required that recommendations for reform 
based on the findings of the review process be submitted to him 
by January 21, 2010. 12 However, this deadline passed without 
the public release of any such recommendations, and, given the 
complexity of the regulations and the political sensitivity of the 
topic of export controls, significant changes are not expected to 
be implemented anytime soon. 13 In the meantime, the only 
(discussing Alcatel's development of ITAR-free satellites); Eligar Sadeh, Expart 
Controls of Space Technologi.es, 6 AsTROPOLITICS 105, 109 (2008). 
9 See Bini, supra note 7, at 70 (stating that the market share of U.S. manufactur-
ers shrank from 64% in 1998 to 36% in 2002, while Alcatel's market share of the 
global satellite business doubled between 1998 and 2004); Philip L. Spector, Satel-
lite Export Controls: Five Years and Counting, 18 AIR & SPACE LAw. 12, 13 (2003) 
(stating that from 2002 to 2003, foreign customers purchased twice as many satel-
lites from foreign manufacturers than from U.S. manufacturers); Ryan Zelnio, 
The Effects of Expart Control on the Space Industry, SPACE REv. Qan. 16, 2006), http:// 
www.thespacereview.com/article/533/l (explaining that prior to the shift of ju-
risdiction over satellite exports to the Department of State in 1999, U.S. satellite 
manufacturers enjoyed, on average, an 83% market share of the global satellite 
sales, but that this market share declined to 50% by 2006). 
10 Major Ronald L. Spencer,Jr., State Superoision of Space Activity, 63 AF. L. REv. 
75, 92 n.96 (2009). 
11 White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-the-Press-Secretary; see also Amy 
Klamper, Obama Memo Puts Expart Reform on Front Burner, SPACE NEws Qan. 15, 
2010), http:/ /www.spacenews.com/ policy I 100115-obama-memo-puts-export-re-
form-fron t-burner.html. Legislation was proposed in 2008 and 2009 that would 
have required a review of the current export regime, but both bills stalled in the 
Senate. Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008, H.R. 
5916, llOth Cong.; Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 
2011, H.R. 2410, lllth Cong. (2009). 
12 Klamper, supra note 11. 
13 Id. (explaining that "export control reform is a polarizing topic that pits 
national security hawks against the American aerospace industry"). 
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hope for relief from the burdens of ITAR lies in the hands of 
the DDTC. As described in this article, the DDTC has indicated 
that it is willing to exercise its administrative discretion in a man-
ner that will enable the nascent human spaceflight industry to 
survive and even flourish in the global marketplace. 14 This indi-
cation was given last year when the DDTC excepted Bigelow 
Aerospace from the need to acquire a license and comply with 
other requirements under ITAR before allowing foreign nation-
als aboard their expandable space stations. 15 This ruling was 
heralded as a breakthrough for the human spaceflight industry, 
which now hopes to be granted the opportunity to operate 
under a reduced regulatory burden, provided that the Bigelow 
ruling is extended to other spaceflight companies, such as those 
offering space tourism services. 
This article tells the story of the DDTC's landmark Bigelow 
ruling and makes the case for why a similar exception should be 
granted to the space tourism companies that will soon be carry-
ing their first customers into space. The following section sets 
the stage for this discussion by providing a preliminary descrip-
tion of the regulations that govern the export of space technol-
ogy and discussing how these regulations should be applied to 
the space tourism industry. This article also examines the 
DDTC's Bigelow ruling in the greater context of administrative 
law and argues that the DDTC's actions provide a striking exam-
ple of how an administrative agency can reshape the law 
through administrative discretion when Congress is paralyzed by 
party factionalism and political pressures. 
II. ITAR AND HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
Whenever a company exports a spacecraft, a launch vehicle, 
or a satellite, the export is subjected to the same controls that 
are applied to the export of arms under the Arms Export Con-
trol Act (AECA) and the AECA's implementing regulations, 
ITAR. 16 It was not always the case that space technology was 
14 See infra Part III. 
is See infra Part III. 
16 In addition to implementing the policies of the U.S. government, the export 
controls imposed by ITAR and the Export Administration Regulations (which, as 
explained below, govern the export of dual-use technology) also implement the 
principles of two international export control arrangements: (1) the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Amis and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies, an international system designed to prevent certain rogue 
countries, including Iran, North Korea, and Syria, from obtaining advanced mili-
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treated as munitions under ITAR. In the 1990s, under President 
H.W. Bush, a movement began to transfer jurisdiction over the 
export of commercial communications satellites from the De-
partment of State to the Department of Commerce (DOC).17 
This movement continued during the Clinton presidency and 
by 1996 most of the licensing responsibilities for the export of 
communications satellites had been transferred to the DOC. Is 
However, the DOC's jurisdiction over commercial satellites was 
short-lived due to an incident in which Hughes Space and Com-
munications Company and Loral Corporation divulged informa-
tion related to two failed launches of Chinese rockets that were 
carrying their payloads to an insurer without the necessary li-
cense from the DOC. I 9 In response to this incident, Congress 
passed the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999, which transferred export licensing of "all satel-
lites and related items" back to the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of State, with the result that virtually all space technology 
was once again subject to ITAR.20 
While certain space technology should unquestionably be sub-
ject to strict export controls in order to prevent the proliferation 
of dangerous weapons, such as technology related to ballistic 
missiles, it is often argued that technologies that have a commer-
cial as well as a potential military application, so-called "dual 
use" items like communications satellites, should be controlled 
under the less restrictive Export Administration Regulations, 
which are administered by the DOC. 2 I The benefit of a jurisdic-
tary technology; and (2) the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a mul-
tilateral arrangement to prevent the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying 
weapons of mass destruction. See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARsEN, SPACE LAw: A 
TREATISE 459-61 (2009); Kenneth A. Dursht, From Containment to Cooperation: Col-
lective Action and the Wassenaar Arrangement, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1079, 1106-10 
( 1998); Elizabeth See bode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: 
Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REv. 157, 189-91 (2004). 
17 See Ram Jakhu & Joseph Wilson, The New United States Export Control Regime: 
Its Impact on the Communications Satellite Industry, 20 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 157, 
171-72 (2000); Zelnio, supra note 9. 
ls Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9. 
19 Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9. 
20 Jakhu & Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-72; Zelnio, supra note 9; Strom Thur-
mond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
261, § 1513, 112 Stat. 1920 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778). The DOC 
maintains jurisdiction over export matters related to the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS) and hardware related to the ISS that has been transferred to the juris-
diction of the DOC through Commodity Jurisdiction Requests. Commerce 
Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 774 Supp. 1 9A004 (2010). 
21 See, e.g., Spector, supra note 9, at 13. 
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tional transfer to the DOC is significant because the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations are notably less burdensome than are 
the controls under ITAR. Generally speaking, a company is less 
likely to be required to seek a license from the DOC prior to the 
export of a controlled item because licenses for the export of 
controlled items are frequently not required for export to allied 
countries, and moreover, various exceptions to the license re-
quirement (such as for a low value shipment or for export to a 
civilian end-user) are also available. 22 
Although the debate regarding the appropriate level of ex-
port controls over the last decade has centered on commercial 
satellites, the DDTC now faces a new question, namely, how 
ITAR should apply to new space technologies that have 
emerged in recent years, in particular, the suborbital 
spaceplanes that have been developed by space tourism compa-
nies and the private space stations that are under development 
by Bigelow Aerospace. Virgin Galactic, the space tourism com-
pany launched by Sir Richard Branson, will be the first to begin 
operations by flying tourists into suborbital space from Space-
port America, which is currently under construction in New 
Mexico.23 (As a brief aside, despite being the brainchild of a 
British citizen, Sir Richard Branson, Virgin Galactic is operating 
in the United States through a Delaware corporation and is 
therefore treated as a U.S. space tourism company.) The 
spaceplanes being built by Virgin Galactic are reusable launch 
vehicles that differ significantly from anything seen before. The 
spaceplane, carrying a crew of two and six passengers, begins its 
journey into space on the underbelly of an airplane that will lift 
the spaceplane to an altitude of 52,000 feet at which point the 
spaceplane will disengage, fire its rocket engine, and fly to an 
altitude of approximately 65 miles above the Earth-just above 
the generally accepted border of outer space, known as the 
Karman Line, which is located approximately 100 kilometers (or 
62 miles) above the Earth.24 After reaching its apogee, the 
22 The Export Administration Regulations are similar to ITAR in one impor-
tant respect, namely, that both the Export Administration Regulations and ITAR 
treat the sharing of controlled technology with a foreign national as an export 
(such sharing of information termed a "deemed export" in the Regulations). 15 
C.F.R. § 734.2(b) (2) (ii). 
23 Jeff Jones, Bill Would Prevent Space Tourist Lawsuits, ALBUQUERQUE]., Feb. 10, 
2009, at Al. 
24 See Spaceships, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/overview/ 
spaceships (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). Regarding the Karman Line, see LYALL & 
LARsEN, supra note 16, at 167-68. 
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spaceplane will begin a slow descent back into the atmosphere, 
its speed broken by an innovative pivoting wing design that en-
ables the plane to flutter through the upper layers of the atmos-
phere like a shuttlecock. 25 Once it reaches the heavier 
atmosphere, the spaceplane glides back to Earth like an air-
plane.26 Other space tourism companies are also offering subor-
bital flights on spaceplanes, such as Rocketplane, an Oklahoma-
based company offering suborbital flights for $250,000, and 
Xcor Aerospace, a California company offering suborbital 
flights for the competitive price of $95,000.27 Starchaser, based 
in the United Kingdom, plans to use both rocket-launched 
space capsules as well as spaceplanes to send private passengers 
into suborbital space.28 Other approaches to human spaceflight 
are also being pursued by private enterprises. For example, 
Blue Origin, a space tourism company founded by Amazon 
founder Jeff Bezos, is developing a unique spacecraft that takes 
off and lands vertically.29 Excalibur Almaz, a company based on 
the Isle of Man, plans to put tourists into orbit in Soviet-made 
Almaz space capsules. 30 The company is also preparing to place 
an Almaz space station into orbit to be used as a space hotel or 
for other civilian purposes.31 Similarly, Bigelow Aerospace's 
planned private space stations (of which two prototypes have al-
ready been placed into orbit) utilize a new technology that al-
lows for expandable modules to be placed in orbit, which are 
then configured to the needs of the client (whether the purpose 
is for manufacturing, research, or pleasure).32 The expandable 
2s See Spaceships, supra note 24. 
26 Id. 
21 Jacqui Goddard, Up, Up and Ka-Ching! In a Time of Tight Budgets and Earthly 
Priorities, the Space Business Is Getting a Rejuvenating jolt from Entrepreneurs Who Do the 
Right Stuff on the Cheap, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2008), http:/ /www.newsweek.com/ 
2008/02/02/up-up-and-ka-ching.html; Reservations, RocKETPLANE GLOBAL, INC., 
http://www.rocketplane.com/reservations.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); Re-
serve Your Ticket to the Edge of Space Today!, XcoR AEROSPACE, http:/ /xcor.com/ 
contact/ticket.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
2s See Typical Space Tourism Mission, STARCHASER, http:/ /www.starchaser.eo.uk/ 
index.php?view=tourism_mission_overview&mgroup=tourists (last visited Sept. 
22, 2010). 
29 Leonard David, Jeff Bezos' Secretive Rocket Program Picks Science Projects, 
SPACE.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.space.com/news/091123-blue-origin-
bezos-rocket.html. 
30 Stephen Baird, Space: The New Frontier!, 67 TECH. TcHR. 13, 18 (2008). 
31 Id. 
32 Mike N. Gold, Lost In Space: A Practitioner's First-Hand Perspective on Reforming 
the U.S. 's Obsolete, Arrogant, and Counterproductive Export Control Regime for Space-
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modules can be packed into launch farings in a highly space-
and weight-efficient manner, thus dramatically reducing the 
cost of placing space stations into orbit.33 
The following sections provide a detailed look at how the cur-
rent export control regulations under U.S. law apply to space 
technology and, in particular, how the regulations are likely to 
apply to the new spaceplane technologies being developed by 
the space tourism companies. 
A. THE AR.Ms EXPORT CONTROL AcT 
Our analysis of export controls applicable to space technology 
begins with section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 
which addresses export controls over munitions. 34 Section 38 
opens with the following provision setting forth the President's 
authority to control the export of munitions, primarily by 
designating what technology should be included on the United 
States Munitions List (USML): 
In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the 
United States, the President is authorized to control the import 
and the export of defense articles and defense services and to 
provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States 
involved in the export and import of such articles and services. 
The President is authorized to designate those items which shall be consid-
ered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this 
section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export 
of such articles and services. The items so designated shall con-
stitute the United States Munitions List.35 
In addition to granting the President the authority to designate 
controlled items, this provision states the overarching purpose 
of these export controls-to promote world peace as well as the 
security and foreign policy goals of the United States. The new 
commercial space technologies of Virgin Galactic and Bigelow 
Aerospace do not threaten peace and security and should there-
Related Systems and Technologies, 34J. SPACE L. 163, 168 n.17 (2008); see also Frank 
Morring, Jr., High Mikage, 168 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 21 (2008). 
33 Leonard Davis, Private Space Stations Edge Closer to Reality, SPACE.COM Qan. 20, 
2010), http://www.space.com/businesstechnology I private-space-stations-bige-
low-100120.html. 
34 22 u.s.c. § 2778 (2006). 
35 Id.§ 2778(a) (1) (emphasis added). The opening provisions ofITAR restate 
the President's authority to regulate the export of munitions and describe how 
this authority has been delegated to the Department of State and, ultimately, to 
the directorate of Defense Trade Controls under the Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs. 22 C.F.R. § 120.l(a) (2009). 
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fore enjoy relief from these controls under the AECA. This ar-
gument is strengthened in light of the factors set forth in the 
AECA that are to be taken into account when determining 
whether an export license should be granted. 36 These factors 
include whether the export of the article would contribute to (i) 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (ii) the spread 
of terrorism, or (iii) the escalation of armed conflict.37 These 
are important concerns to be sure, but if these are truly Con-
gress's concerns, then there is no reason for the government to 
subject purely commercial space technology to the AECA. As 
discussed further below, the absence of such policy concerns in 
the context of the technology being used by space tourism com-
panies should facilitate the granting of exceptions by the DDTC 
to reduce the regulatory burden on these companies. 
B. ITAR CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
At the core of the ITAR regime is the requirement that a li-
cense from the DDTC be acquired prior to the export of any 
"defense article."38 A "defense article" is any item listed in sec-
tion 121.1 of ITAR, better known as the United States Munitions 
List-as well as any "technical data recorded or stored in any 
physical form, models, mockups or other items that reveal tech-
nical data directly relating to items" on the USML.39 Section 
120.3 of ITAR sets forth specific criteria for determining 
whether a particular item that is not already listed on the USML 
could be classified as a "defense article" and thus subjected to 
ITAR control.40 Such a determination can be made if the item 
in question (1) is designed for military use, does not have a pri-
mary civilian application, and exceeds the performance stan-
dards of equivalent civilian equipment, or (2) is designed for 
military use and has "significant" military value (regardless of its 
performance standards or whether it has a predominant civil 
application). 41 
The threshold question for Bigelow Aerospace and the space 
tourism companies is whether their equipment would be 
deemed a "defense article." Under the section 120.3 criteria, it 
appears that neither the Bigelow space stations nor Virgin Ga-
36 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(2). 
37 Id. 
38 22 C.F.R. § 127.l(a)(l). 
39 Id. § 120.6. 
40 Id. § 120.3. 
41 Id. 
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lactic's spaceplanes should qualify as "defense articles."42 They 
are not designed for military use, they only have a civil applica-
tion, and they cannot be said to exceed the performance stan-
dards of comparable civilian equipment since no comparable 
civilian equipment exists-Bigelow's space stations and Virgin 
Galactic's spaceplanes are alone in their class.43 Nevertheless, 
despite the apparent failure of this technology to meet the crite-
ria for being designated a "defense article" under section 120.3, 
the space stations and spaceplanes still come under a specific 
listing of controlled technology on the USML, and are therefore 
subject to ITAR control. The relevant entry in the USML for the 
human spaceflight industry is Category XV, which includes lan-
guage that brings spacecraft and other space-related technology 
within the scope of ITAR.44 
An analysis of Category XV reveals that the entry has four 
main parts. First, all "spacecraft" and all "ground control sta-
tions" engaged in the telemetry, tracking, and control of space-
craft are "defense articles" and therefore come within the ambit 
of ITAR.45 The term "spacecraft" is not defined in the regula-
tion, which allows for a wide net to be cast by the DDTC when 
applying the regulations. The only guidance given in the regu-
lations is that the term "spacecraft" includes commercial satel-
lites (which, in turn, includes Bigelow's orbiting space 
stations). 46 The space tourism companies should argue in their 
commodity jurisdiction requests (seeking the removal of their 
spaceplane technology from the USML) 47 that although their 
spaceplanes are "spacecraft" in the colloquial sense, they are 
purely commercial and therefore should not be subject to ITAR. 
This interpretation is consistent with the treatment of aircraft, 
which are subject to ITAR only if "designed, modified, or 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. § 121.1 Category XV. 
45 Id.§ 121.1 Category XV(a), (b). The exact language from subsection (a) is: 
"[s]pacecraft, including communications satellites, remote sensing satellites, sci-
entific satellites, research satellites, navigation satellites, experimental and multi-
mission satellites." 
46 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(a). That Bigelow's space stations are defense arti-
cles has been established by the DDTC's denial of Bigelow's request for a ruling 
that its technology was not covered by, or should be removed from, the USML. 
See infra Part III. 
47 Regarding commodity jurisdiction requests, see infra Part III. 
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equipped for military purposes"-thus, commercial aircraft are 
not regulated by ITAR.48 
In addition to being on the USML, spacecraft are also treated 
as "significant military equipment" (SME), for which "special ex-
port controls" can be applied due to the military utility of the 
technology (which designation is indicated by an asterisk prior 
to the USML entry).49 Happily, this SME designation does not 
apply to commercial satellites unless they are used for military 
purposes, thus sparing Bigelow Aerospace from the threat of 
these special controls.50 
The second part of Category XV is made up of paragraphs ( c) 
and (d), which bring two special categories of space technology 
within the scope of ITAR: global positioning systems (GPS) re-
ceivers and radiation-hardened circuitry.51 These categories of 
controlled items would only apply to space tourism companies 
to the extent that such equipment is used.52 
The third part of Category XV, set forth in paragraph ( e), 
significantly expands the scope of ITAR by applying it to "[a]ll 
specifically designated or modified systems or subsystems, com-
ponents, parts, accessories, attachments," and other equipment 
associated with spacecraft, ground controls stations, and the spe-
cial GPS and radiation-hardened technology. 53 
The fourth and final component of Category XV is found in 
paragraph (f), which applies ITAR to all "technical data" and 
"defense services" directly related to any of the items mentioned 
in Category XV or any "launch support activities," such as pro-
viding launch parameters to a launch provider. 54 
The definition of "defense service" includes, among other 
things, providing a foreign person with "technical data" relating 
to a defense article.55 The sharing of such data will constitute a 
"defense service" whether the data is divulged in the United 
48 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category VIIl(a). 
49 Id.§§ 120.7, 121.1 Category XV(a), Note. 
50 Id.§ 121.1 Category XV(a), Note. 
51 Id.§ 121.1 Category XV(c), (d). 
52 See id. 
53 Id.§ 121.1 Category XV(e). This section excludes from ITAR's control nine 
specific types of components, such as space-qualified data recorders and certain 
types of photovoltaic arrays, unless they are designed for military use. Id. 
54 Id.§ 121.1 Category XV(f). 
55 Id.§ 120.9(2). "Defense services" also include: (1) "[t]he furnishing of assis-
tance (including training) to foreign persons" in the design, manufacture, modi-
fication, use, testing, repair, or even the destruction of a defense article; and (2) 
the provision of military training. Id.§ 120.9(a)(l), (3). 
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States or abroad.56 "Technical data," in turn, is broadly defined 
in section 120.10 to include the following four concepts: 
(1) Information [in whatever format] ... which is required for 
the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, 
operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of de-
fense articles. . . . 
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and de-
fense services; 
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order; and 
( 4) Software ... directly related to defense articles.57 
The scope of controlled "technical data" related to launch sup-
port activities is particularly broad by explicitly including "tech-
nical data provided to the launch provider on form, fit, 
function, mass, electrical, mechanical, dynamic, environmental, 
telemetry, safety, facility, launch pad access, and launch parame-
ters, as well as interfaces for mating and parameters for 
launch."58 Of particular concern to the space tourism industry 
is the inclusion of safety information in this expanded definition 
of technical data.59 For example, a space tourism company 
could potentially be found to be providing a "defense service" 
merely by training a foreign customer in safety procedures, such 
as the operation of safety hatches on the vessel. This concern 
will be addressed, and hopefully allayed, in the following section 
where the safety training requirements of the U.S. human 
spaceflight regulations are discussed.60 As a final comment, it 
comes as some measure of relief that "basic marketing informa-
tion" is explicitly excluded from the definitions of both "techni-
cal data" and "defense article."61 And so space tourism 
companies can at least rest assured that they need not seek a 
license before launching websites that market their suborbital 
adventures. 
C. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN p ASSEN GERS ARE 
FOREIGN NATIONALS 
Even assuming that suborbital spaceplanes come within the 
definition of "spacecraft" under Category XV of the USML and 
are therefore defense articles, a license from the DDTC is still 
56 Id. § 120.9(a) (2). 
57 Id. § 120.10. 
58 Id. § 121.1 Category XV(f). 
59 See id. 
60 See infra Part 11.C. 
61 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(a)(5), 120.6. 
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not required unless the spaceplanes are exported. Thus if, for 
example, Virgin Galactic's spaceplanes are flown by its U.S. sub-
sidiary from a U.S. spaceport, such as Spaceport America in New 
Mexico, and land there as well, no exportation would seem to 
take place, thus apparently avoiding the burdens of ITAR.62 
This is, however, not the case. The concept of an "export" is 
broadly defined under ITAR to include not only the physical 
movement of defense articles across the borders of the United 
States, but also the following actions: 
• "Transferring registration, control or ownership to a for-
eign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by 
the U.S. Munitions List ... "; 
• "Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or trans-
ferring in the United States any defense article to an em-
bassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign government 
"· 
... ' 
• "Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or trans-
ferring technical data to a foreign person ... "; and 
• "Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the ben-
efit of, a foreign person .... "63 
This broad concept of what constitutes an export under ITAR 
thus includes not only selling controlled items into foreign 
countries, but embraces the disclosure of information related to 
controlled technology to a "foreign person,"64 regardless of how 
such disclosure is made.65 
Once again, of particular concern to Bigelow Aerospace, Vir-
gin Galactic, and the other human spaceflight companies is 
whether in the course of their discussions with, and training of, 
62 See id.§ 120.17(a), (b). 
63 Id. § 120.17. 
64 The definition of "foreign person" includes: (1) "any natural person who is 
not a lawful permanent resident" of the United States (or a lawful refugee or 
asylee); (2) any corporation (or other organization) "that is not incorporated or 
organized to do business in the United States"; and (3) "international organiza-
tions, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments 
.... " Id.§ 120.16. 
65 Space technology is accorded special treatment in two respects in the defini-
tion of "export." First, the mere transfer of registration, control, or ownership of 
satellites (even if no physical transfer takes place-presumably due to the fact 
that the satellite is in orbit) constitutes an export. Id. § 120.l 7(a) (2). That a 
license is needed before such transfers take place is reiterated in section 123.8. 
Id. § 123.8(a). Exportation also takes place if a satellite located in the United 
States is registered in a foreign country. Id. § 123.8(b). Second, the definition 
makes clear that exportation is not deemed to have taken place merely because a 
launch vehicle or payload is launched into space. Id.§ 120.17(a)(6). 
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their foreign customers they will be deemed to have disclosed 
"technical data" relating to their spacecraft-which might, in 
turn, be treated as the export of a defense article or the per-
formance of a "defense service."66 As explained above, "techni-
cal data" includes information "required for the ... operation" 
of the spacecraft, which could be broadly interpreted to include 
safety information provided to passengers regarding the opera-
tion of hatches and other onboard safety equipment.67 If this 
interpretation is adopted by the DDTC and such safety informa-
tion is deemed to be controlled data, the disclosure of the infor-
mation without DDTC approval would be prohibited regardless 
of the form in which such data is displayed or stored (whether 
in documents, models, or other items) and regardless of how 
the data is communicated (whether by the sharing of docu-
ments, email, conversation, or by visual inspection).68 There-
fore, the mere presence of a foreign national on a Bigelow space 
station or a spaceplane could be deemed to be an "export" of 
technical data on the grounds that the passenger was provided 
with the opportunity for a visual inspection of the design of the 
equipment.69 As a result, a license from the DDTC would be 
required before any foreign passengers could set foot on the 
space station or spaceplane.70 
On the other hand, it is not clear that information regarding 
safety operations would necessary come within the definition of 
"technical data."71 Under a more reasonable interpretation of 
the definition, information regarding safety operations would 
not be treated as "technical data" since such safety operations 
are not strictly "required" for the operation, i.e., the flight of the 
spaceplane-just as the instructions given to airplane passengers 
seated in the exit row of an airplane prior to take-off regarding 
the opening of the emergency hatches does not provide them 
with the information needed to fly the airplane.72 In fact, the 
Air Force routinely puts on air shows that often provide the civil-
ian attendees, whether U.S. citizens or foreign nationals, the 
chance to view military aircraft up close and sometimes even sit 
66 See id. §§ 120.9, 120.10. 
67 Id.§ 120.lO(a)(l). 
68 See id.§§ 120.lO(a)(l), 125.2(c). 
69 See id.§ 120.17(a)(4). 
10 See id.§ 125.2(c). 
11 See id. § 120.10. 
12 See id. 
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in the cockpits. 73 There is apparently no concern about the 
transfer of technical data in these situations-just as there 
should be no concern about the transfer of technical data to 
space tourists. If the DDTC adopts this more reasonable inter-
pretation, no license would be required prior to training the 
passengers. 
In a recent article, P J. Blount examined the possibility that 
the disclosure requirements under the FM's Human Space 
Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants 
(Space Flight Regulations) may compel the disclosure of "tech-
nical data."74 One of the provisions of the Space Flight Regula-
tions that poses this risk is the requirement that the spaceflight 
company train passengers how to respond to emergency situa-
tions on board, which could include information about how to 
operate emergency hatches and other safety mechanisms on the 
spacecraft. 75 In addition, prior to the company receiving any 
compensation or entering into a flight agreement, the regula-
tions require that the company disclose in writing to prospective 
passengers information regarding "each known hazard and risk 
that could result in a serious injury, death, disability, or total or 
partial loss of physical and mental function .... "76 Moreover, 
prior to flight, the company must provide "an opportunity to ask 
questions orally to acquire a better understanding of the 
hazards and risks of the mission" prior to the passenger provid-
ing written consent that indicates that the passenger under-
stands the risks of the mission. 77 
Although there is certainly a risk that the safety training and 
other disclosures required under these provisions may amount 
to the disclosure of "technical data," there is also a strong likeli-
hood that ITAR would not be triggered, depending in part on 
73 For example, the public air show at Scott Air Force Base in Shiloh, Illinois, 
allows visitors to view planes up close and meet pilots and crew members. Scott 
AFB Airshow Information, ScorrAIRSHow.coM, http:/ /scottairshow.com/info.html 
(last visited July 17, 2010). A Florida airshow reportedly let a civilian sit in the 
cockpit of a military jet. Mark Spivak, F-15 Demo Team, 33rd RCS Team for Interna-
tional Air Show, INSIDE AETC (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/ 
story.asp?id=l23140976. 
74 P J. Blount, Informed Consent v. !TAR· Regulatory Conflicts that Could Constrain 
Commercial Human Space Right, 66 ACTA AsTRONAUTICA 1608, 1610 (2010). 
Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants, 71 
Fed. Reg. 75,616-75,645 (Dec. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 
415, 431, 435, 440, & 460). 
1s 14 C.F.R. § 460.51 (2010). 
1s Id. § 460.45(a). 
11 Id. § 460.45 (f). 
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the nature of the information disclosed. Blount argues that any 
instruction provided regarding the operation of safety hatches 
or other safety procedures would likely be treated as a disclosure 
of technical data under ITAR, particularly in light of the lan-
guage in Category XV of the USML, which states that "safety" 
data related to "launch support activities" is deemed to be tech-
nical data "without exception."78 However, this language should 
not be interpreted as requiring information provided to a pas-
senger in the course of safety training to be treated as technical 
data "without exception" since the paragraph is limited to infor-
mation disclosed in connection with "launch support activi-
ties. "79 This language contemplates information disclosed to 
launch providers, not passengers, as is indicated by the example 
provided in the text which states that an example of such techni-
cal data provided in connection with launch support activities 
includes "technical data provided to the launch provider on the 
form, fit, function, ... safety, ... [and] launch parameters, as 
well as interfaces for mating and parameters for launch."80 De-
spite these arguments against the treatment of safety training as 
involving the disclosure of technical data, the risk remains that 
the DDTC will come to a different conclusion. 
As Blount points out in his article, a more difficult situation 
could arise during the question and answer session required by 
the Space Flight Regulations in order to allow the passengers to 
become fully informed of all risks. 81 It is conceivable that pas-
sengers will inquire into more sensitive aspects of spacecraft 
technology, such as the type of propellant used by the spacecraft 
or engine mechanics-inquiries that would not be unreasonable 
since this information is relevant to a thorough understanding 
of the risks of spaceflight.82 However, if the company discloses 
technical information of this type to a foreign customer, the 
DDTC could find that the company has exported "technical 
data" under ITAR.83 
There is some irony in the fact that, on the one hand, ITAR 
prohibits space tourism companies from disclosing safety infor-
mation to foreign customers without first acquiring an export 
license, while, on the other hand, the Space Flight Regulations 
78 See Blount, supra note 74, at 1610; 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XV(f) (2010). 
79 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XV(f). 
80 See id. 
81 Blount, supra note 74, at 1610-11. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 1610. 
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may very well require the disclosure of such information. How-
ever, even if ironic, the regulations are not contradictory, and 
compliance with both is necessary. The result is that a space 
tourism company will have to acquire a license from the DDTC 
before making any disclosures to a foreign passenger or pro-
spective passenger that may rise to the level of "technical data" 
under ITAR. An alternative approach would be for a company 
to limit the type of information provided to its passengers and 
rely on the advice of lawyers that the information provided does 
not qualify as "technical data"-but this may be an unwise risk. 
Moreover, the refusal to provide certain types of information 
when requested by the passenger during the question and an-
swer session may constitute a violation of the Space Flight Regu-
lations and could lead to increased exposure to tort liability due 
to a failure to obtain the fully informed consent of a passenger. 
If a space tourism company is deemed to disclose technical 
data to foreign customers, whether in discussions with the cus-
tomer, during flight training, or by virtue of the mere presence 
of the customer on the spaceplane, the company will need to 
first register with the DDTC84 (which registration must be re-
newed annually) and must then acquire a separate license from 
the DDTC with respect to each customer prior to making any 
disclosures. 85 The average processing time reported by the 
DDTC for acting on license requests is approximately two to 
three weeks. 86 
If the only requirement imposed by ITAR were the license re-
quirement, the burden on space tourism companies would not 
be so severe. However, substantial additional obligations are in 
fact imposed by the regulations. For example, space tourism 
companies will be required to enter into a Technical Assistance 
Agreement (which describes the parties to the transaction, the 
information to be disclosed, and the nature of the project) with 
each of its foreign customers prior to the disclosure of the con-
trolled information.87 A Technical Assistance Agreement is re-
quired whenever a company discloses technical data to a foreign 
person or engages in a "defense service."88 Although the DDTC 
84 22 C.F.R. § 122.1. In fact, a space tourism company would be required to 
register with the DDTC as soon as it manufactured or acquired a spacecraft. Id. 
8s Id. § 123.1. 
86 License Processing Times, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, http:// 
www.pmddtc.state.gov/metrics/index.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2010). 
87 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.9, 124.1 et seq.; Gold, supra note 32, at 168 n.18. 
ss 22 C.F.R. § 124.l(a). 
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strives to approve Technical Assistance Agreements within sixty 
days of submission, it is not unusual for approval to take up to 
three months after the agreements are submitted for approval.89 
The renegotiation of the conditions (or "provisos") placed on 
the disclosure of the controlled information with the DDTC can 
take an additional one to three months.90 When U.S. space 
tourism companies are competing for foreign customers, this 
time-consuming approval process would be a dangerous hin-
drance that could destroy the ability of U.S. companies to com-
pete with foreign operators. Imagine a customer that would like 
to fly into space who has a choice between a U.S. company that 
must seek approval of a Technical Assistance Agreement and a 
foreign company that need not. The customer could potentially 
face a delay of up to six months before the U.S. company could 
even begin training. It would not be surprising if prospective 
foreign customers instead decided to fly with a foreign space 
tourism company to avoid such regulatory delays. 
In order to avoid the complications of obtaining the approval 
of a Technical Assistance Agreement, space tourism companies 
could argue for an exemption under section 124.2(a), which 
states that "[t]echnical assistance agreements are not required 
for the provision of training in the basic operation . . . of de-
fense articles lawfully exported."91 This exemption would ap-
pear to apply to the training of passengers in safety operation, 
provided that a license permitting the disclosure was granted. 
Of course, it would be preferable if the DDTC would make a 
determination excepting the space tourism companies entirely 
from ITAR with respect to their interactions with passengers. 
D. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN LAUNCHING FROM NoN-
ALLIED COUNTRIES 
The burdens of IT AR could grow far greater when a U.S. com-
pany launches its satellites from the territory of a country that is 
neither a member of NATO nor another "major non-NATO 
ally" as defined in section 120.32 of ITAR.92 First, under section 
89 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 32, at 168. 
9o Id. at 168-69. 
91 22 C.F.R. § 124.2(a). 
92 See id.§§ 120.32, 124.15(a) (1). NATO consists of twenty-eight current mem-
bers including Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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124.15, a Technology Transfer Control Plan (TICP) has to be 
approved by the Department of Defense (DOD).93 A TTCP is a 
written plan that describes the process for transferring the con-
trolled information to foreign nationals and explains how the 
information will be safeguarded from improper disclosure as 
well how proper disclosures will be documented.94 The process 
of developing and obtaining approval of a TICP can take any-
where from one to three months.95 The entire process of ob-
taining a license, receiving approval of a Technical Assistance 
Agreement, and obtaining approval of a TTCP has reportedly 
taken as long as one year.96 If these regulatory burdens were 
placed on U.S. space tourism companies, the delay would almost 
certainly send prospective customers to foreign competitors that 
were not subject to such delays. 
In addition to the approval of a TTCP, when U.S. companies 
conduct launches from non-allied territories the DOD has to be 
notified in advance of any discussions with foreign nationals re-
lated to the launch-and the DOD then has the right to moni-
tor these discussions.97 These monitoring activities are carried 
out by the DOD's Defense Technology Security Administration 
(DTSA) .98 The DTSA also has the right to send agents to the 
launch site to monitor the launch as well as all related activity 
and discussions with all monitoring expenses, as well as all travel 
expenses, being borne by the owner of the space object.99 
These monitoring expenses can be significant. For example, af-
ter Bigelow Aerospace launched its first prototype space station 
from Russia, it received a bill of $161,896 from the DTSA merely 
for monitoring expenses, which came out to a rate of approxi-
mately $130 per hour (and which did not include the travel ex-
Member Countries, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries. 
htm (last visited July 14, 2010). "Major non-NATO allies" include Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel,Japan,Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Paki-
stan, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. Id. 
93 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a) (1). 
94 Gold, supra note 32, at 169 n.19. 
95 Id. at 169. 
96 Id. 
97 22 C.F.R. §§ 124.15(a)(l), 124.15(a)(2). 
98 Space Directorate, DTSA, http:/ /www.dtsa.mil/Directorates/SD.aspx (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2010). 
99 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a)(2). Section 124.15 also requires a license prior to the 
participation of any U.S. party in a launch failure investigation or analysis-and 
allows for DOD monitoring of any activities related to such investigation. Id. 
§ 124.15(b). 
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penses of the DTSA monitors). 100 Although these special 
controls are intended to apply to launches from non-allied 
countries, the regulations state that these controls can be ex-
tended to launches from allied countries. IOI 
While these special controls are undeniably applicable to the 
launch of Bigelow Aerospace's expandable space stations from a 
Russian launch site, these controls should not necessarily apply 
to the launch of suborbital space tourism flights. The language 
of section 124.15 is reproduced here to show how it is limited to 
the launch of "satellites" and therefore would not apply to the 
launch of suborbital spacecraft: 
The export of any satellite or related item (see§ 121.1, Category 
XV(a) and (e)) or any defense service controlled by this sub-
chapter associated with the launch in, or by nationals of, a coun-
try that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization or a major non-NATO ally of the United States al-
ways requires special exports controls .... 102 
The reference to "any defense service controlled by this sub-
chapter associated with [a] launch" presents the possibility that 
the operations of a suborbital spaceflight company could come 
within the scope of this provision when flying out of a non-allied 
country. If the government adopts this interpretation, oral dis-
closures made to foreign space tourists could be deemed to be a 
technical discussion that would be subject to monitoring. On 
the other hand, it would be more reasonable to argue that this 
provision was intended to apply only to the launch of satellites 
(and defense services related to the launch of satellites) and not 
to the taking off of a spaceplane. 
E. THE DDTC's D1scRETION To GRANT ExcEPTIONs 
FROM ITAR 
Despite the strict controls on the export of space technology 
described in the preceding sections, section 126.3 of ITAR 
grants the DDTC broad discretion to grant exceptions from the 
application of the regulations as follows: "In a case of excep-
tional or undue hardship, or when it is otherwise in the interest 
of the United States Government, the Director, Office of De-
fense Trade Controls may make an exception to the provisions 
100 Gold, supra note 32, at 181. 
101 Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(c). 
102 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a) (emphasis added). 
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of this subchapter."103 This provision allows the DDTC to grant 
an exception from ITAR (which composes the entire "sub-
chapter" referred to in this section) under the circumstances de-
scribed. As written, the discretion should be utilized primarily 
in cases of "exceptional or undue hardship," but can also be ap-
plied under any circumstances in order to serve "the interest of 
the United States Govemment."104 No further guidance is given 
regarding the type of governmental interest that would allow for 
the suspension of ITAR, which means that it could potentially 
be of any nature, whether based on national security, diplomatic 
concerns, or commercial interests. The discretion provided by 
section 126.3 was apparently instrumental in the Bigelow ruling 
and also allows for the granting of similar exceptions to space 
tourism companies, as explained in the following sections. 
III. THE BIGELOW AEROSPACE COMMODI1Y 
JURISDICTION REQUEST 
Some of the most eloquent and incisive comments regarding 
the regulatory burdens imposed by ITAR are found in the writ-
ings of Michael Gold, the Corporate Counsel and Director of 
the Washington office of Bigelow Aerospace.105 In various publi-
cations, Mr. Gold has described the surprisingly onerous (and 
often nonsensical) demands that have been placed on Bigelow 
Aerospace as the company launched its prototype space stations 
into orbit from Russia. 106 In what has become one of the more 
famous examples of the unreasonable requirements imposed 
under ITAR, Mr. Gold has described how Bigelow Aerospace 
was required (by a proviso in its Technical Assistance Agree-
ment) to guard on a 24/7 basis a simple stand that was used to 
hold the prototype space station prior to its being loaded into 
the launch faring. 107 Although the stand was from a functional 
perspective not much different from a card table, it was deemed 
103 Id. § 126.3. 
104 Id. 
105 See Gold, supra note 32, at 164; Mike N. Gold, Thomas Jefferson, We Have a 
Probl.em: The Unconstitutional Nature of the U.S. 's Aerospace Export Control Reg;i,me as 
Supported by Bernstein v. U.S. Department of Justice, 57 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 629, 
642-43 (2009); see also Interview with Michael Gold, REs COMMUN IS (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http:/ I rescommunis. word press.com/ 2008 I 04/28 /in terview-mike-gold-corpo-
rate-counsel-bigelow-aerospace. 
106 See sources cited supra note 105. 
107 Gold, supra note 32, at 172-73. 
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to be modified for use with controlled space technology and 
was, therefore, itself subject to ITAR controls.108 
Prior to the DDTC's ruling that excepted Bigelow from cer-
tain aspects of ITAR, Bigelow Aerospace feared that it would 
have been required to acquire a license from the DDTC before 
allowing any foreign national to set foot on one of its space sta-
tions.109 For example, if Bigelow placed into orbit a space sta-
tion that was to be visited by foreign nationals, ITAR would have 
required that Bigelow obtain a license (by submitting a DSP-5 
form) for each foreign national that was anticipated to inhabit 
the space station.110 This requirement would also apply to any 
third party that might purchase a Bigelow space station. That is, 
if Bigelow placed a space station into orbit and then transferred 
the station to a U.S. purchaser, the purchaser would have to ob-
tain a license prior to permitting a foreign national to enter the 
space station. In addition to the costs of seeking such a license, 
there would also have been a risk that the DDTC would deny a 
license, thus preventing the foreign national from entering the 
space station at all. 
In addition, Bigelow would have been required to enter into a 
Technical Assistance Agreement with each foreign passenger, 
which would then have to be submitted to the DDTC for its ap-
proval. 111 Bigelow was also concerned that the more burden-
some requirements regarding the creation of a Technology 
Transfer Controls Plan and DTSA monitoring of all conversa-
tions with foreign passengers would be triggered if the space sta-
tions were launched from non-NATO countries.112 If these 
provisions of ITAR would have been applied strictly to Bigelow's 
operations, it may have jeopardized the success of the company 
since it would have made it far more difficult to attract and 
maintain foreign customers. The pool of potential customers 
for Bigelow's space stations is small to begin with and a signifi-
cant portion of that pool is composed of foreign companies and 
space agencies. Therefore, the possibility that ITAR would in-
terfere with Bigelow's ability to fully tap into the foreign market 
was a threat to the company's viability. 
One way that a company can escape the burdens of ITAR 
compliance is to ask the DDTC to remove the company's tech-
ws Id. 
109 See Klamper, infra note 117. 
110 See Gold, supra note 32, at 176. 
m See id. at 177-79. 
112 See supra Part 11.D. 
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nology from the USML by way of a "commodity jurisdiction re-
quest" (CJ request).11 3 When submitting a CJ request, the 
applicant is requesting that the DDTC remove the applicant's 
technology from the USML, thus transferring the technology to 
the jurisdiction of the DOC, which oversees exports of dual-use 
items under the EAR.11 4 
On December 27, 2007, Bigelow Aerospace submitted a CJ re-
quest to the DDTC seeking to remove its expandable space plat-
form technology from the USML.115 Although the DDTC 
typically makes a determination within three or four months af-
ter receiving a request, a decision was not to be issued in this 
case for sixteen months.116 The suspense was broken on April 
22, 2009, when Bigelow Aerospace announced that the DDTC 
had responded favorably to its CJ request.117 The DDTC had 
ruled that the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space 
station, as well as the training of these private astronauts, re-
ferred to collectively by Mr. Gold as the "passenger experience," 
was "non-licensable" under ITAR, meaning that the obligations 
imposed by ITAR would not apply to this aspect of Bigelow's 
operations.118 Michael Gold had succeeded in his argument 
that just because a person has seen a space station does not 
mean that he or she can build one. 
This ruling was rather unusual in that the DDTC will typically 
decide either to remove the technology at issue from the USML 
(thus transferring jurisdiction to the DOC) or to keep the tech-
nology on the USML (and continue to require licenses for ex-
113 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2010). 
114 See Introduction to Commerce Department Export Controls, BuREAu OF IN-
DUSTRY AND SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/exportingbasics.htm 
(last visited July 17, 2010). Section 120.4 explains that a commodity jurisdiction 
request can be used either "if doubt exists as to whether an article or service is 
covered by the U.S. Munitions List" or "for consideration of a redesignation of an 
article or service currently covered by the U.S. Munitions List." 22 C.F.R. § 120.4. 
115 Bigelow Petitions State for Export jurisdiction Change, SPACE NEws, Mar. 3, 2008; 
Space Techno/,ogy: Earthbound. Export Control in the Space Business Has Gone Over-
board, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2008; Gold, supra note 32, at 171 n.21. 
116 In the course of this decision process, Michael Gold remained philosophi-
cal during what was unquestionably a suspenseful time for him and Bigelow Aero-
space. When asked about the long wait, he showed no impatience, but instead 
insisted that he was more interested in a good decision rather than a speedy one. 
117 Bigelow Aerospace has not released to the public either its commodity juris-
diction request or the DDTC's response. See Amy Klamper, Mike Gold, Corporate 
Counsel and Director of Washington Operations, Bige/,ow Aerospace, SPACE NEWS (Aug. 
31, 2009), http:/ /www.spacenews.com/profiles/091009profile-mike-gold.html. 
11s Id. 
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port) .11 9 In Bigelow's case, the technology remained on the 
USML, but the requirements for a license, Technical Assistance 
Agreement, Technology Transfer Control Plan, and monitoring 
will no longer apply with respect to the "passenger experi-
ence. "120 Despite the fact that it was not expressly stated in the 
ruling, the DDTC was apparently exercising the discretion 
granted to it under section 126.3 to grant an exception from the 
application of ITAR when it made this ruling. 
Although it may appear that Bigelow Aerospace fell short by 
not succeeding in having its technology removed from the 
USML, this ruling appears to have been the best result for Bige-
low since a transfer of its technology to the DOC would have 
likely meant that a license would have to have been sought 
under the Export Administration Regulations. However, under 
the "non-licensable" ruling, Bigelow does not have to apply for 
licenses from either the DDTC or the DOC. Prior to this DDTC 
decision, the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space 
station would have triggered the various burdens under ITAR. 
The continuation of this policy would have placed an extraordi-
nary burden on Bigelow due to the expensive and time-consum-
ing process of complying with these requirements for each 
foreign national present on a Bigelow space station. Bigelow 
Aerospace's successful CJ request has removed these obstacles 
and, as a result, has promised to breathe new life into the pri-
vate spaceflight industry. 
It is worth noting that the DDTC ruling is not without its lim-
its. First, the ruling only applies to Bigelow Aerospace. There-
fore, unless the ruling is replicated for other spaceflight 
companies, it will, in reality, have no effect on the space industry 
because, as explained below, there is no value in an exception 
for people on a space station if the spaceflight companies that 
have to deliver the people to the space station are subject to the 
debilitating burdens of ITAR. Second, prospective passengers 
who are nationals of the so-called "[s]ection 126.1 countries" 
would still need a license from the appropriate agency before 
being able to enter a Bigelow space station. 121 Section 126.1 of 
ITAR states that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to deny 
licenses and other approvals for exports and imports of defense 
articles and defense services, destined for or originating in cer-
119 See supra Part II.B. 
120 See Klamper, supra note 117. 
121 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2009). 
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tain countries . . . [including] Belarus, Cuba, Eriteria, Iran, 
North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela" as well as to "countries with 
respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo 
(e.g., Burma, China, Liberia, and Sudan)."122 
Despite these limitations, the DDTC's ruling on Bigelow's CJ 
request was heralded by other spaceflight companies as a major 
breakthrough that promises to significantly ease the regulatory 
burden on their operations.123 For example, Marc Holzapfel, 
counsel to Virgin Galactic, called the ruling a "major develop-
ment" that will enable space companies to avoid the "compli-
cated, expensive, and dilatory export approval process."124 
Likewise, the chief counsel of SpaceX, Tim Hughes, praised the 
DDTC for adopting "a common-sense approach to ITAR."125 
However, since the Bigelow ruling only provides relief to Bige-
low Aerospace and does not apply to either Virgin Galactic or 
other space tourism companies, these companies will have to 
seek similar relief on their own. 
IV. EXTENDING THE BIGELOW RULING TO SPACE 
TOURISM COMPANIES 
Since Bigelow Aerospace announced the receipt of its 
favorable ruling, there have been reports that Virgin Galactic 
has already filed a CJ request that will rely on the Bigelow ruling 
as precedent.126 Other space tourism companies will likely fol-
low suit. The typical method of requesting a section 126.3 ex-
ception is through the submission of a General Correspondence 
letter to the DDTC. That Virgin Galactic has submitted a CJ 
request indicates that the company is attempting to have its 
spaceplane technology removed from the USML or else receive 
a ruling that the term "spacecraft" in Category XV of the USML 
does not include commercial spaceplanes (just as commercial 
aircraft are not covered by ITAR). 127 The criteria considered by 
the DDTC when determining whether to remove a particular 
122 Id. 





126 Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, Meeting Minutes 
(May 21, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ 
ast/advisory_committee/meeting_news/archive/media/May%2021 %202009. 
pdf. 
121 See supra Part 11.B. 
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technology from the USML are the same criteria that are taken 
into account when determining under section 120.3 whether a 
particular technology should be designated as a "defense arti-
cle," namely, whether the technology: (1) is designed for mili-
tary use, does not have a primary civilian application, and 
exceeds the performance standards of equivalent civilian equip-
ment; or (2) is designed for military use and has "significant" 
military value. 128 These criteria receive further elaboration in 
section 120.4, but the primary criteria remain the same.129 
Looking at the plain language of ITAR, suborbital spaceplane 
technology of the type being developed by space tourism com-
panies should be removed from the USML since it has not been 
designed for military use and does not exceed the performance 
of equivalent civilian space tourism equipment. 130 That said, the 
DDTC is likely to consider the potential military application of 
the spaceplane technology when making its determination. 
With respect to this issue, the DDTC should take into account 
the fact that the spaceplanes that are currently under develop-
ment are not in the same class of launch equipment that lofts 
satellites into orbit and can easily double as ballistic missiles. Al-
though there may be some concern that these spaceplanes 
could deliver weapons of mass destruction to a target, the cur-
rent state of spaceplane technology should eliminate any such 
concerns since the suborbital vehicles are not capable of point-
to-point flight to any significant degree, but only return to their 
point of departure. 131 In light of this, it appears that the test for 
removing spaceplanes from the USML has been met, and the 
12s See supra Part 11.B. 
129 22 C.F.R. § 120.4. 
130 See id. 
131 It should be obvious that the space tourism equipment should not be char-
acterized as any of the controlled items under the MTCR, whether as a rocket, a 
"space launch vehicle," or a "reentry vehicle," simply because spaceplanes are not 
missiles and such technology was not contemplated by this control regime. See 
Peter van Fenema, Expart Controls and Satellite Launches: What's New?, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTI-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER SPACE 239, 241 
(2004) (citing the MTCR guidelines which make clear that the purpose of the 
MTCR is to prevent the transfer of technology that can deliver weapons of mass 
destruction and that the MTCR is "not designed to impede national space pro-
grams"); see also Waldrop, supra note 16, at 176, 190 (explaining that the "greatest 
concern ... is that space launch vehicles essentially are ballistic missiles"). Like-
wise, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
(ICOC) is concerned with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and 
should be not applied to the launch of commercial spaceplanes. For a discussion 
of the nature and scope of the ICOC, see van Fenema, supra at 241-45. 
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DDTC would be able to make such a ruling in response to a CJ 
request from Virgin Galactic and the other space tourism 
companies. 
On the other hand, perhaps Virgin Galactic is simply follow-
ing Bigelow Aerospace's example by submitting a CJ request 
while still expecting nothing more than a section 126.3 excep-
tion of the "passenger experience." And whether this narrower 
request to render the "passenger experience" excepted from 
, ITAR-as was done for Bigelow Aerospace-is made either in 
the form of a CJ request or a General Correspondence letter, 
the DDTC should grant the request for two reasons. First, the 
refusal to grant such an exception to the space tourism compa-
nies would render the Bigelow ruling a nullity. Second, the cir-
cumstances for granting an exception under section 126.3 of 
ITAR are clearly met in the case of space tourism companies in 
light of (i) the exceptional hardship that would be caused by the 
strict application of ITAR and (ii) the strong interest that the 
United States has in supporting the success of the private 
human spaceflight industry.132 
The first point is a rather obvious one, namely, that the 
DDTC's previous ruling regarding Bigelow's operations would 
be meaningless unless similar relief is granted to the companies 
that will deliver people to the Bigelow space stations. The com-
panies that Bigelow will rely on to deliver scientists, manufactur-
ers, and recreational visitors to its space stations are likely to be 
the same companies that are now offering suborbital tourism 
services. These companies will continue to refine their technol-
ogy until they are able to provide orbital delivery. However, 
without relief from ITAR, the tourism companies may not be 
able to survive even for the short term, let alone long enough to 
develop orbital delivery capabilities. And without such services 
being available, Bigelow Aerospace's space station venture will 
collapse as there is no sense in placing a space station in orbit if 
its stands empty. 
In addition to this first point, the DDTC should except the 
"passenger experience" of the space tourism companies from 
ITAR under section 126.3 because the grounds for granting 
such an exception are clearly met. As explained above, the 
DDTC has the power to grant an exception from the application 
of ITAR in the event of "exceptional or undue hardship, or 
132 See 22 C.F.R. § 126.3. 
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when it is otherwise in the interest of the United States."133 Al-
though it is only necessary to show either exceptional hardship 
or that the exception is in the interest of the United States, both 
prerequisites are easily met in this case. First, it is undeniable 
that the space tourism companies face exceptional hardship 
under the ITAR regulations. In fact, the space tourism compa-
nies face even greater hardship than the hardship faced by Bige-
low Aerospace. This is true because space tourism companies 
will have a much higher number of passengers per year than 
Bigelow would have on its space stations and will therefore have 
to apply for many more export licenses to allow for the disclo-
sures to the passengers that are mandated under the Human 
Space Flight Regulations, as well as for allowing the passengers 
on board (and thereby potentially disclosing "technical data" re-
lated to the spacecraft by means of visual inspection). For exam-
ple, Virgin Galactic plans on eventually launching multiple 
flights per day with six passengers per flight, which could even-
tually amount to thousands of passengers every year. 134 In addi-
tion, the disclosure of technical data will also require space 
tourism companies to enter into a Technical Assistance Agree-
ment with each individual passenger-an agreement which 
must then be submitted to the DDTC for approval prior to the 
disclosure of any such data. 135 The cost and complexity of ac-
quiring licenses and entering into Technical Assistance Agree-
ments for each passenger would be colossal and would 
unquestionably harm a company's ability to attract foreign cus-
tomers who would likely prefer to fly with a foreign space tour-
ism company that is not subject to the cost, uncertainty, and 
delay of the U.S. regulatory regime. 
The success of the space tourism industry would also be 
threatened by the special controls under section 124.15, which 
are triggered by the provision of defense services related to a 
launch from a non-allied territory. As described above, these 
special controls require Technology Transfer Control Plans as 
well as permit the DTSA to monitor all discussions and activities 
related to the launch (with the expense of such monitoring be-
ing borne by the company).136 While Bigelow was concerned 
that section 124.15 would be triggered by the presence of their 
133 See supra Part ILE. 
134 See, e.g., Leonard David, Virgin Galactic Details Its Space Travel Plans, 
MSNBC.coM (Nov. 11, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15654772/. 
135 See supra Part 11.C. 
136 22 C.F.R. § 124.15. 
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customers on their space stations, there is a good argument that 
this provision would not have been triggered since Bigelow will 
not be involved with the launch of these customers. 137 Passen-
gers will be delivered to the space stations by other compa-
nies. 138 And if Bigelow is not involved in the launching of its 
customers, then the customers' presence on the space station 
would not be subject to section 124.15.139 Of course, Bigelow 
would still be subject to section 124.15 when launching its space 
stations from non-allied territory,140 but that is a less contentious 
issue since, although burdensome, such launches would take 
place relatively infrequently (compared with the frequency of 
space tourism flights). 
In contrast, it seems far more likely that the activities of space 
tourism companies will trigger the application of the special 
controls under section 124.15 when the flights are launched 
from non-allied territories since customers of space tourism 
companies will actually be involved on a first-hand basis in the 
launching of the spacecraft. 141 Therefore, not only do these 
companies run the risk that they may be found to be providing 
defense services by disclosing to their passengers (through visual 
inspection and safety training) technical data relating to their 
spacecraft, but this defense service may be deemed to be pro-
vided in connection with the launch of the spacecraft, thus trig-
gering the controls of section 124.15. 
Admittedly, the special controls of section 124.15 only apply if 
the tourism companies launch from non-allied territories. It 
may seem that space tourism companies may easily avoid 
launching from non-allied territories and thus avoid the bur-
dens of section 124.15.142 After all, the list of NATO countries 
and major non-NATO allies is a long one, including at this point 
forty-three countries.143 However, there are significant omis-
sions from this list. For example, Sweden is neither a member 
m See supra Part Ill. 
135 See supra Part III. 
139 At the most, the presence of the customers on a Bigelow space station 
would be treated as an export of the space station (through visual disclosure) or 
the provision of a defense service, which would only require an export license 
and Technical Assistance Agreement. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying 
text. 
140 See supra Part 11.D. 
141 See supra Part 11.D. 
142 See supra Part 11.D. 
143 Member Countries, supra note 92. 
2010] SPACE TOURISM AND EXPORT CONTROLS 611 
of NATO nor a major non-NATO ally.144 This is significant be-
cause Spaceport Sweden is one of the spaceports that plans to 
provide services to the space tourism companies. 145 Some for-
eign space tourism companies are also pursuing the possibility 
of launching flights from a spaceport in Abu Dhabi or Dubai. 146 
Once again, U .S.-based space tourism companies will have a 
hard time following foreign competitors to these launch sites 
due to the fact that neither Sweden nor the United Arab Emir-
ates are on the list of allied countries. These launch sites are 
attractive due to their ability to serve the customer pools of Eu-
rope and the Middle East-where a large number of potential 
customers with sufficient funds for this type of adventure tour-
ism are to be found. Unfortunately, U.S.-based companies may 
be locked out of this market unless they are relieved of the bur-
dens of section 124.15. 
To make one final point regarding section 124.15, the DDTC 
could also choose to interpret the section as applying only to 
"defense services" related to the launch of satellites (and not the 
launch of a spaceplane), since the opening of the section men-
tions the export of satellites in particular-in which case the en-
tire specter of section 124.15 would evaporate. 147 In the event 
that this narrow reading of the section is not adopted, the 
DDTC should at least grant an exception under section 126.3 
with respect to disclosures made to space tourists. 
In addition to the grounds of exceptional hardship that space 
tourism companies would suffer under ITAR, a "passenger expe-
rience" exception from ITAR should be granted solely on the 
grounds that such an exception would be in the interest of the 
United States. The interest that would be served is two-fold. 
First, the space tourism industry is a significant development in 
the commercialization of space, and the technological develop-
ments that result from these early tourism ventures are likely to 
lead to more substantial commercial ventures, such as orbital 
manufacturing, orbital research laboratories, point-to-point 
space travel, and even the mining of the moon or other celestial 
bodies. The United States has a great interest from an eco-
144 Id. 
145 Virgin Galactic Appoints First Space Travel Agents in Scandinavia, SPACEPORT 
SWEDEN (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.ssc.se/?id=9504&cid=l4435. 
146 Loveday Morris, Space Tourism Set for Gulf Blast-Off, THE NATIONAL (May 3, 
2009), http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090503/NATIONAL/705029935/ 
1010. 
147 22 C.F.R. § 124.15(a) (2009). 
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nomic perspective in being at the forefront of this industry and 
should therefore modulate the application of ITAR in a manner 
that will foster the competitiveness of U.S. companies. 
In addition to the economic interests at stake, the United 
States has a strong interest in ensuring the success of U.S. 
human spaceflight companies from the standpoint of national 
security. A strong space presence has for a long time been an 
important component of American strength and national secur-
ity.148 And now that the Obama Administration plans to elimi-
nate NASA's spaceflight program and rely instead on the private 
space industry to meet the government's spacefaring needs, it 
has become essential for the government to make every effort to 
facilitate the success of the private spaceflight industry-which 
at this point means supporting the space tourism industry. This 
does not mean that certain export controls cannot be kept in 
place when required to prevent the proliferation of dangerous 
technologies, but it does mean that the DDTC should grant ex-
ceptions wherever possible in order to ease the regulatory bur-
den on these young companies. 
The DDTC should also be confident that granting a "passen-
ger experience" exception to the space tourism companies 
would not result in the proliferation of the dangerous technolo-
gies that ITAR is designed to prevent. As discussed above, the 
spaceplanes that are currently under development are designed 
for purely commercial purposes and do not have the potential 
of delivering weapons to a target. 149 Moreover, the tourism 
equipment is not designed for military use and therefore does 
not come within the criteria for ITAR control set forth in sec-
tion 120.3.150 And not only is technology not of a type that 
should raise national security concerns, but the transmission of 
the "technical data" to space tourists is also of a nature that fails 
to warrant the application of export controls. Even if the 
Human Space Flight Regulations are interpreted broadly to re-
quire disclosure about every aspect of spacecraft safety and po-
tential risks, it is highly unlikely that the information divulged to 
passengers (or the equipment that is visible to passengers) will 
entail the level of technological detail that is relevant to the con-
struction and flight operation of the spaceplanes (unless a pas-
148 For a discussion of the history of the United States' reliance on the com-
mercial space industry for national security needs, see Waldrop, supra note 16, at 
158, 199. 
149 See supra Part N. 
lso See supra Part 11.B. 
2010] SPACE TOURISM AND EXPORT CONTROLS 613 
senger happens to inquire about engine mechanics or other 
highly technical matters). 
For the reasons set forth above, the U.S. government has little 
to fear and much to gain from easing the regulatory burdens on 
the space tourism industry by excepting the "passenger experi-
ence" from ITAR. The discretion that the DDTC has been 
granted in section 126.3 allows the agency to adjust the applica-
tion of ITAR in an appropriate manner to achieve the policy 
goals of maintaining security while also protecting the interest 
of the Unites States in supporting this new industry of private 
human spaceflight. The relaxation of ITAR in order to support 
the innovative and important ventures undertaken by the new 
space tourism industry is precisely the situation that section 
126.3 was intended to address. And as discussed in the follow-
ing section, if the DDTC does not provide relief to the space 
tourism industry, then it is likely that no relief will be provided, 
since Congress does not seem capable of reforming the law 
given the political paralysis that has gripped our nation's capital. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE FUTURE OF 
EXPORT CONTROL REFORM 
The stated commitment of the Obama Administration to ex-
port control reform provides hope that the unnecessary regula-
tory burdens described in this article will be lifted from the 
shoulders of commercial human spaceflight companies, thus al-
lowing them to thrive in the global marketplace. The recent 
bills that passed the House in 2008 and 2009 also show that sup-
port for reform exists in Congress.151 However, when these re-
forms will take place and what the nature of these reforms will 
be is uncertain. The mere removal of commercial satellites 
from the USML will not benefit tourism. These reforms, if they 
occur at all, may not be implemented for years. In the 
meantime, space tourism companies are on the verge of begin-
ning their operations, and therefore regulatory relief must be 
granted to these companies through the exercise of the DDTC's 
administrative discretion to grant exceptions from ITAR or to 
remove spaceplane technology from the USML entirely. 
The DDTC's actions connected with the Bigelow ruling and 
the potential for the DDTC to grant relief to the space tourism 
companies provide a striking example of an interesting phe-
nomenon in the field of administrative law. One of the more 
1s1 See H.R. 5916, llOth Cong. (2008); H.R. 2410, lllth Cong. (2009). 
614 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [75 
debated issues in the field of administrative law is the matter of 
administrative discretion and, in particular, the benefits and 
dangers of providing administrative agencies with discretion to 
tailor the application of law to individual cases. 152 By easing the 
regulatory burdens on Bigelow Aerospace, the DDTC has illus-
trated the benefit of administrative discretion in two distinct 
ways. First, the DDTC has shown how administrative discretion 
can be used to adjust the application of a statute to new technol-
ogies and fact scenarios that were not contemplated during the 
drafting of the statute. Second, the DDTC has shown how an 
administrative agency, through its discretionary powers, can act 
in place of the constitutionally established organs of govern-
ment when these organs are unable to take action themselves 
due to political paralysis. 
The idea that administrative discretion is useful, and even 
necessary, in order to adjust the application of law to unforesee-
able circumstances has been widely recognized. 153 Kenneth 
Culp Davis identifies this primary purpose of administrative 
agencies in his seminal 1969 book, Discretionary justice, when he 
explains that one of the main reasons for the tremendous in-
crease in administrative discretion in the United States during 
the nineteenth century was that the legislature was unable to 
craft a set of rules in advance to cover unforeseeable future cir-
cumstances or new developments that were sure to arise during 
a time when society, technology, and business were evolving at a 
rapid pace. 154 As Davis points out, the mechanical application 
of an inflexible rule (such as the blanket rule subjecting all 
space technology to ITAR) will certainly lead to unjust or unde-
sirable results. 155 Discretion is needed in order to tailor the gen-
eral rule to the unique circumstances of a particular case in 
order to produce a result that properly balances the relevant 
interests and policies. 156 This careful balancing of various poli-
cies in light of the specific facts of a case is best carried out on a 
case-by-case basis at the administrative level-which was the ra-
152 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Administrative Law Legacy of Kenneth Culp 
Davis, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 315, 331-37 (2005). 
153 Id. 
154 Kenneth Culp Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 15-17, 
20, 24 (1969). See, in particular, Davis's statement that "[i]nventing rules to an-
swer all regulatory questions is far beyond the intellectual capacity of the ablest 
men." Id. at 42. 
155 Id. at 19. 
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tionale behind the inclusion of section 126.3 in ITAR, giving the 
DDTC discretion to grant an exception from the application of 
the regulations in the event of "exceptional or undue hardship, 
or when it is otherwise in the interest of the United States.''157 
The Bigelow CJ request was the perfect scenario for the appli-
cation of the DDTC's discretion to grant an exception from the 
regulations. The DDTC was faced with a request to determine 
whether Bigelow space stations were subject to ITAR. Unable to 
rule that the space stations were not satellites (since they orbit 
the Earth), the DDTC could only respond by ruling that ITAR 
would apply to the export of the space stations. 158 However, it is 
to the credit of the DDTC that it recognized that the imposition 
of the regulations would threaten the viability of this new indus-
try. Bigelow Aerospace was not a communications satellite man-
ufacture or a provider of launch services-it was instead a new 
type of business that provided for the private habitation of 
space. And iflTA.."ll were strictly applied to Bigelow's operations, 
the burden could crush the new company. This was the perfect 
opportunity for the DDTC to use the discretion that had been 
granted to it in section 126.3 to issue an exception since there 
was every indication that the strict application of the regulations 
would result in "exceptional or undue hardship.''159 Moreover, 
it was also in the interest of the United States to ease the regula-
tions and allow this groundbreaking company to grow in a rea-
sonable regulatory environment since the company's success will 
contribute greatly to the evolution of a vibrant new private space 
industry. 
The other benefit of the administrative discretion wielded by 
the DDTC under section 126.3 is of a type that has not been 
widely recognized in scholarly literature-at least not in the par-
ticular form illustrated by the Bigelow ruling. This benefit is 
found in the ability of the DDTC to grant an exception to com-
mercial space companies from the burdens of ITAR when the 
legislative branch is so paralyzed by the politics of the day that it 
is unable to modify the law to remove commercial satellites from 
the scope of ITAR, as has been demanded by industry and 
academia for years. 160 In other words, the DDTC has shown how 
administrative discretion allows for the law to be modified in its 
151 22 C.F.R. § 126.3 (2009). 
15s See supra Part III. 
159 22 C.F.R. § 126.3. 
160 See supra note 5. 
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application by the administrative agency when the legislature is 
unable to make necessary amendments to the law due to the 
paralyzing effects of political pressures. 
The current highly factionalized political environment has 
made it virtually impossible for any meaningful legislative re-
forms to pass both houses-and the reform of arms trafficking 
regulations poses special challenges.161 Any politician who rec-
ommends relaxing ITAR (even if they are really only talking 
about the exemption of purely commercial technology) opens 
himself to political attacks for being soft on national defense.162 
In this political climate, the legislature is paralyzed. And with-
out the legislature being able to enact the necessary ITAR re-
forms, the only hope lies with the DDTC, which has the 
discretion to grant an exception from the regulations when nec-
essary. The use of administrative discretion to solve the prob-
lem of political paralysis in the age of terror, party factionalism, 
and divided government strikes a chord that is similar to the 
"public choice" theory in administrative law, which, as enunci-
ated in Pierce's treatise on administrative law, states that politi-
cians prefer to allow administrative agencies to make 
controversial policy decisions rather than make a decision that 
may alienate a segment of voters and thus place the politicians' 
political career in jeopardy.163 Although the reality of political 
paralysis is an unfortunate development that signals a profound 
flaw in our democracy, it has illustrated how, when the tradi-
tional constitutional organs of government are paralyzed by 
politics or are otherwise dysfunctional, administrative agencies 
can step in and shape the law in a reasonable manner pursuant 
to their discretionary powers. 
161 For a first-hand account of the current paralysis of Congress, see Evan Bayh, 
Why I'm Leaving the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at WK9; see also RICHARD J. 
PIERCE,JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 134-35 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining how 
party factionalism has led to gridlock because different parties control the Presi-
dency and Congress-and each has the power to thwart the other branch); Peter 
Beinart, Why Washington Is Tied Up in Knots, TIME, Mar. 1, 2010, at 20. 
162 See Spector, supra note 9, at 14 (explaining that at the time of his writing 
the article there was a "strong group within Congress that ... is largely suspicious 
of any efforts that might appear to make satellite exports easier" and that "[i]t 
seems unlikely that meaningful reforms will be enacted ... when U.S. representa-
tives are not likely to embrace any bill that exposes them to a charge of being 
'soft' on national security"). 
163 PIERCE, supra note 161, at 99; see also Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Admin-
istrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 81 (1985). 
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This reliance on the authority and discretion of the DDTC to 
grant an exception from the ITAR regulations in order to allow 
for the successful operation of the new human spaceflight indus-
try may, given the current political climate, be a more realistic 
alternative to the revision of the regulations. By giving the 
DDTC officers an opportunity to tailor the application of the 
existing regulations in a reasonable manner, the burden of 
ITAR on commercial space enterprises could be reduced signifi-
cantly. However, since an exception under section 126.3 only 
affects the operations of the requesting company, broad relief 
across the industry would require each of the space companies 
to file their own request. This task could be made easier if com-
panies would share their CJ requests in order to enable others to 
submit similar requests. This would obviously require the shar-
ing of valuable information with competitors-but would be 
done in order to achieve the greater goal of improving the com-
petitiveness and viability of the spaceflight industry as a whole. 
If the DDTC granted a series of exceptions from the application 
of ITAR with respect to the "passenger experience," it would 
pave the way for a formal revision of the USML to remove the 
burdens of ITAR from this aspect of the spaceflight company 
operations. For once the section 126.3 exceptions are granted 
and the spaceflight industry proves itself to be an important and 
viable industry, the suggestion to formalize the exception in a 
revision of the regulations should entail less political 
controversy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States is entering a new age of space commerciali-
zation that will be fueled by the Obama administration's new 
reliance on services provided by private companies. Now more 
than ever the strength of the U.S. space program will depend on 
a robust domestic industry that is able not merely to service the 
needs of the government, but actually replace the government 
spaceflight program. The policy is daring and forward-thinking, 
but it also comes with risks. An entrepreneur in the space indus-
try will have to surmount the impossible by succeeding in an 
exotic venture that is capital intensive, technologically challeng-
ing, and-if that were not enough-burdened by a byzantine 
regulatory system that promises substantial attorneys' fees and, if 
violations occur, crushing penalties. Fortunately, these regula-
tory hurdles can be largely removed by easing the impact of the 
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ITAR regulations in a manner that properly balances commer-
cial needs with security concerns. 
Although the current political environment-characterized 
by factionalism, a split government, and, in the end, governmen-
tal paralysis-has made it impossible for Congress to respond to 
the clear need to reform ITAR, the DDTC has used its discretion 
wisely to except Bigelow Aerospace from the those aspects of 
ITAR that threatened the survival of the company. This use of 
administrative discretion to modify the application of law when 
the constitutional organs of government are unable to act is a 
powerful example of the importance of administrative agencies 
to our democracy-when government breaks down, the agen-
cies can take over the work of government. This article has 
made the case for why the DDTC should continue to exercise its 
discretion by granting similar exceptions for the "passenger ex-
perience" to the space tourism companies that will soon begin 
to fly customers into space. The need for such an exception is 
even stronger for such companies than was the case for Bigelow 
Aerospace since their number of customers will be significantly 
larger than those of Bigelow and the nature of their operations 
will be more likely to trigger ITAR controls. The interests of the 
United States demand that these exceptions be granted. A suc-
cessful domestic commercial spaceflight industry will not only 
bring jobs, prosperity, and technological advantages to the 
United States, but will also ensure the strength of our govern-
ment space program, which, under the Obama Administration's 
new space policy, will rely more than ever on private industry. 
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